more of the debates within which the term was utilized, as well as full analyses of those other terms against which qīng was often defined—terms such as xīng (nature) and yù (desires). But I do hope I have made a small contribution to such a study by analyzing at least some of the rich ways that the term qīng was employed, defined, and debated in the early period, and by pointing out that some of the specific definitions of qīng discussed by recent scholars as representing the basic meaning of the term in fact emerged in the course of that debate itself.

THE SEMANTICS OF QÍNG 情
IN PRE-BUDDHIST CHINESE
CHRISTOPH HARBSMEIER

Linguistic articulation in speaking or writing involves a series of complex and variously motivated choices between culturally pre-defined linguistic alternatives.

In this case study, I shall deal with the notion of qīng 情 in the context of the repertoire of choices this word enters with semantically adjacent words. The appendix on near-synonyms and on antonyms will focus systematically on these contrasts.

Psychological Vocabulary in Early Inscriptions

One of the striking features of oracle bone characters is the almost complete absence in them of the “heart” radical, which became so common already in Warring States inscriptions. Xú Zhōngshǐ 1981, arranged according to radicals, brings this out most strikingly: under the heart radical, the columns with oracle bone and bronze inscriptions are pervasively empty.

Zhào Chéng 1988 divides oracle bone characters into 26 semantic groups: he has no category for psychological terms. Xú Zhōngshǐ 1981: 406-417 is naturally not up to date with recent discoveries, but the overall pattern that emerges from these pages is clear enough: the heart radical emerges as a productive formative element in the bronze inscriptions and develops considerably in Warring States inscriptions, e.g. markedly in the Hóumá méngshū 侯馬盟書 and fully flourishes throughout Han epigraphy. Shi Xìjié 1998: 114, a useful and remarkably beautiful survey of inscriptions from Wǔ and Yuè, lists 10 characters with the heart radical.

Consider a list of the (variously listed) seven “passions”: The antecedent of xi 喜 is used as a place name and a personal name, not
as a psychological term. 喜 怒, 悼, 哀, 恙, 哭, 悲, 疼, 欲 do not have recognised antecedents in oracle bone inscriptions.

The concepts of the 心 心, 心 “heart”, 思 “think of, long for”, 想 念 “think about”, 志 質 “ambition, aspiration”, 慎 “be careful about”, 貼 貴 “respect”, 費 “be loving”, 哭 哭 “understand”, 哭 哭 “console”, 喜 喜 “admire”, 喜 喜 “show compassion”, 喜 處 “be stupid”, 大 處 “be lazy”, 大 處 “forget”, 大 處 “be confused”, 處 處 “resent”, 想 想 “resent”, 喜 想 “be angry”, 喜 想 “regret”, 費 “be sad”, 委 “be moved”, 哭 哭 “be terrified”, 喜 喜 “love” are absent in oracle bones and gradually emerge in the bronze, bamboo and silk inscriptions of later times. I take this to be an evolution not in the language but in the conventions regarding what was written down, and how things were written down.

There would be nothing unnatural in the oracle bones employing such psychological notions. The administrative practice of the archivists, however, was to exclude psychologising perspectives in their formal records. The scribes act was inconsistent with a psychological angle of attention.

There is good reason to study the emergence of the realm of the psychological and in particular of the emotional in epigraphy and in ancient Chinese recorded literature. In particular, SHI is already rich in psychological terminology which needs to be studied with close attention being paid to the dating of the various parts of the book.

One step further, beyond the development and deployment of a vocabulary for psychological terms, is the development and deployment of an abstract vocabulary for such general terms as that of the “emotions”, the “passions”. Thus we are interested not only in the conceptual repertoire of the ancient Chinese within the field of the emotions, we are also interested in the development of their abstract conceptualisations within this broad linguistic area.

In particular, we need to investigate the notion of 情 情, which came to denote emotional reactions and came to resemble in certain ways what Western tradition called the passions of the soul, pathèmata tés psychèss in the language of Aristotle.¹

¹ The present paper concentrates on the received literature, because it was this literature which was widely read and thus shaped Chinese linguistic and intellectual history. It is obvious that this study would need to be supplemented by a detailed contrast of the huge corpus of excavated texts. In particular, the Guòdīn strips contain at least 16 relevant occurrences of the graph 情 that can be plausibly transcribed as 情, which provide fascinating evidence that the word did indeed have clear psychological meanings in whatever period we must ascribe to these manuscripts. Moreover, the later bamboo manuscripts provide considerable further evidence of various uses of the word. It would be interesting to see if the contrasts between the use of the word in the received literature and the excavated literature are systematic.

When in Guòdīn strip 342 we read 君子美其情 “the gentleman beautifies his essential nature/basic emotions”, that provides no challenge to what we would have predicted from the received texts. And when in strip 325 we seem to be told that 情生於性, 態生於性, that is, 費端於性, 之故於性, et cetera, one might try to translate: “the Way starts out from the emotions, the emotions are born from (human) nature; in the beginning one is close to the emotions, but in the end one is close to rectitude.” However one will, in the end, come to read these Guòdīn texts, it is clear that in them 情 has become something of a central philosophical term that is psychological rather than generally metaphysical in nature. Indeed, the phrase 情生於性 was felt to be so important that it was repeated in strip 362.
    This is predominant in lyrical poetry, particularly in CHUCI.

Some preliminary remarks may be useful although they will be felt to be superfluous by many familiar with work in conceptual history:

- In many contexts, these meanings shade into each other and overlap. Thus, as in any detailed historical dictionary, our concern in distinguishing meanings is with significant distinctions in focus, not with absolute differences of meaning.

- The labels I introduce are abbreviated labels of convenience only, and they must be understood as explained in the glosses that explain them. Thus, for example, "anthropological" does not refer to any branch of the social sciences in the context of this paper. It is simply the best I could do as a shorthand for the explanation of the category that I have given above.

- In order to highlight the contrasts concerned I shall naturally want to "overtranslate" and thus in a sense to overstate the distinctions that I find important.

- The subject of this paper is thus not the commonalities between the meanings, but their characteristic diversity.

- The last thing I aim for is consistency in translation even-within a given category, because the aim is to show the variety of meaning produced by context even within each of our categories.

- The categories I introduce are developed from a detailed survey of many hundreds of examples. The aim of this conceptual analysis is not to impose such current schemes as "objective versus subjective", "constant versus dynamic", "universal versus unique", "manifested versus hidden", "commendatory versus pejorative" on the material. On the contrary, I try to reconstruct the clusters of usages that suggest themselves on the basis of the primary sources as one works through the hundreds of relevant example passages in the literature.

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**QING IN PRE-BUDDHIST CHINESE**

1. Factual: The Basic Facts of a Matter

In a wide range of usages, qing 情 "the real facts, the basic fact, basic facts" is devoid of all emotional content, and is also devoid of all nuances of metaphysical depth. In this current meaning, we shall only understand the word properly to the extent that we learn to appreciate its specific difference in nuance from such other words as shi 事 "reality (versus mere name); objects", shi 事 "the facts (as posing a task for human action)", shi fei 事非 "the rights or wrongs of a matter, what is right or wrong". Thus in the examples that follow, the reader must constantly bear in mind two questions:

A. Could any such near-synonyms have been used in the context?
B. What semantic differences would by such substitutions.

Understanding factual qing 情 is to be able to answer these two questions coherently and in a well-argued way.

The basic meaning of qing 情 in ZUO is manifestly not emotional but relates to that proto-metaphysical meaning I have noted in YI, and in the following examples qing 情 refers to the basic real facts of a situation.

(1) ZUO Zhuang 10.1 (684 B.C.); Yang Bojun 183; Wang Shouqian et al. 125; tr. Legge 86

公曰：

「小大之獄，

雖不能察，

必以情。」

The duke went on to say:

"In all matters of legal process, although I may not be able to search them out thoroughly, I make it a point to decide according to the basic facts."

The decision is on the basis of real fact, not of prejudice or of hearsay. It is hard to see how any of the main synonyms could be used in this context.

A prototypical context in which qing 情 is preferred is in context where these real facts might be hidden or are hidden:
(2) ZUO Xiang 18.3 (555 B.C.); Y:1037; W:875; tr. Legge:478
「吾知子，
敢匿情乎？
I know you well,
and would never dare keep back the
truth from you.”

In ZUO Ai 8.03 女言其情 “The lady told the truth”, ZUO Zhao 13.09 敢不盡情 “Must I not tell you the complete truth?” ZUO Zhao 13.02 而告之情 “he explained the basic situation to them” reference is not to some abstract truth as opposed to lies, but “the basic relevant determinant features of a situation” as opposed to some mere appearances or made-up artificialities. No experienced reader of ZUO would be tempted to read any metaphysics or any emotions into contexts like these.

The role of qīng 情 is particularly complex in GUAN and HANFEI. Some examples link perfectly into the pattern established in ZUO:

(3) GUAN 72.01.03; ed. Dai Wang 3.64; tr. Rickett 1998:373
「吾欲藉（籍）於人。
“I want to place a special tax on
men.

何如？”

管子對曰：

「此隱情也。」

How about that?”

Guänzi replied politely:

“That will lead to their concealing
their true numbers.”

This is not the hiding of some underlying number of people, it is the hiding of the plain facts about population numbers. This unmetaphysical function of qīng 情 may well be relevant in some of the cases where a more profound reading is made possible by the context, and often opted for by modern readers. In GUAN the manifestly unprofund cases abound:

(4) GUAN 46.01.80; ed. Dai Wang 3.55; tr. Rickett 1998:161
尺寸尋丈者，
The chǐ and cūn, xún and zhāng
所以得長短之倩也，
are the means for determining true
length.

The real underlying facts, the real story behind a matter are always something that may be hidden, disclosed, spied out, investigated, and the knowledge of which allows one to be in control of events:

(5) HANFEI 44.09.08; Chen Qitian 240; Chen Qiyou 925; Zhou Xunchu 603f; Zhu Shouliang 1538
察四王之情，
If one investigates the basic facts
about these four kings carefully
貪得之意也，
it turns out they were eager after
度其行，
if one assesses their conduct
暴亂之兵也。
they were violent and rebellious
軍 men.

Here HANFEI speaks as a political philosopher. The focus is certainly not on feelings, but on the real story behind the kings. Like a lawyer, the political philosopher is trying to find out what really happened. This is not quite as trivial as some of the above cases, because it involves judgements of what is and what is not immediately relevant to a proper understanding of these kings.

The real facts are something that one clearly might like to learn about or understand:

(6) ZGC 1.25; tr. Crump 1979 no. 34, p. 47
秦之愷重，
Kings are rich in wealth and power,
未可知也。
but it is not possible to know
秦欲知三國之倩，
whether she wants the real situation in
Three States.

(7) ZGC 1.26; tr. Crump 1979 no. 35, p. 47
盡翰西周之情於東周，
He revealed all of West Zhōu’s
affairs to East Zhōu.

There is normally no question of revealing a deep interpretation of the basic factors. What is being revealed is simply the relevant facts of the matters at hand. In contexts like these we do not in fact expect shí 實 “the facts” because the latter in this kind of meaning has a strong tendency to be used in explicit opposition to other terms like míng 名 “name only”:

(8) ZGC 3.13; tr. Crump 1979 no. 55, p. 64
陳將去楚之秦，
Chén Zhēn left Chǔ and returned to
Qín.
2. Metaphysical:
Underlying and Basic Dynamic Factors or Inherent Principles

There usually is nothing metaphysical about the facts of a matter. However, when one decides what are the basic facts, the crucial facts, the facts that constitute the underlying driving force in developments, then one enters the semantic development of a new realm. At the end of this development lies something like a metaphysics of essential inner driving forces that determine the course of changes in the universe.

In medical texts, qīng 情 gets naturally linked to an essential aetiology rather than to a study of symptoms:
SUGUEN 12, ed. Shanghai 1995: 99 得病之情 is to “get to the dynamic inner cause of the disease, the basic inner condition versus the external symptoms”. Similarly for SUWEN 26, ed. Shanghai 1995: 204 莫知其情而見邪也: “No one understands the real underlying factors, but they can see the nasty external symptoms.” Maybe this is a later conceptual development but it perfectly illustrates what I take to be the core “metaphysical” meaning of qīng 情. For I do not intend anything necessarily mystical or obscure, only something underlying, basic.

The Book of Changes, YI, has the notion of qīng 情 at the very core of its project:


When Heaven and Earth stimulate then the myriad things are created.
When the sage stimulating the hearts of men
then the entire world finds peace.
If we observe how things are stimulated,
then the fundamental dynamic features shaping Heaven and Earth
and all the myriad things can be seen.

My deliberate over-translation here is designed to make explicit the semantic features that I believe to be constitutive of the “metaphysical” meaning of qīng 情.

I note in passing that the notion of gàn 感 which came to be heavily invested with psychological meanings, has no such connotations in early Chinese literature. When ZHUANG speaks of gàn ér hòu qīng 感而後情 “first respond after one has been stimulated”, this does not involve human feelings, only external stimulation, so that the current lexicographic gloss gànjué 感覺 for gàn 感 is an anachronism insofar as it suggests subjective feeling and emotion. In any case, the crucial phrase is repeated in YI, ed. Lòu Yúlìè 1980 p. 387; tr. Lynn 1994 p. 345 天地之情可見矣。“The basic dynamic factors in Heaven and Earth may be seen.” To bring this about, to make this palpable, is the project of the Book of Changes. Cf. YI, ed. Lòu Yúlìè 1980, p. 558; tr. Lynn 1994 p. 77.

What YI is all about, is discovering the “essential dynamics” in the world of changes, the underlying realm of real dynamic characteristics that are the essential factors in bringing about change. At this crucial point in the book, the keyword is qīng 情. Interestingly, the Maewingdu 馬王堆 manuscripts never write our word with the heart radical, hesitating as they do between 諧 and 情.

Interestingly, LAO seems not to have use for qīng 情 at all, and the word is not in the text at all, whereas ZHUANG is full of puzzling examples that seem close in force to the specific uses of the word.
cultivated in YI. ZHUANG takes qìng 情 to be something deep-seated and constant, something constitutive, if not defining, something that does indeed make one think of the Latin word *essentia*:

(10) ZHUANG 6.223

死生・命也，
其有夜且之常，
天也。
人之有所不得與，
皆物之情也。

Life and death are a matter of fate.
Their constant alternation, like that of day and night,
is a matter of Heaven.
What man is unable to interfere with
is always the *essential dynamic features* in things.

There is nothing psychological or anthropological here, nothing observably factual: we have a neatly metaphysical use of *qìng 情* in the technical sense I use the word here.

Fate and Heaven belong to a metaphysical realm of ineluctable constancy. The metaphysical *qìng 情* belongs firmly in this realm, the profound realm with which it is not given man to interfere because they are *basic and constant*. And this realm of the constant is not an abstract realm removed from the creatures of this world, it is inherent in the creatures of this world. Thus *qìng 情* is always the *qìng 情* of something. It does not exist *in statu absurdo*.

Imperceptibly, this usage may occasionally verge towards the more psychological:

(11) ZHUANG 32.1280; tr. CH

達生之情者愧，
達於知者恥;

He who reaches to *essential features* of life is a giant;
he who reaches (mere) understanding is slight.

Like the Way, *qìng 情* is not something that is primarily understood, at most one can aspire to dà 達 "get to it", and this raises one onto the new "metaphysical" level of something like the gigantic Nietzschean Übermensch. This one achieves because one operates no longer on *symptoms* but on essential realities.

Even in psychological contexts *qìng 情* is by no means to be identified with *xīn 心* "attitude" and retains, even within the psychological realm, something metaphysical. While we would never have *qìng zhì xīn 情之心* we do find:

(12) GUAN 49.02.01.01; ed. Dai Wang 2.99; tr. Rickett 1998:40

彼心之情，
利安以寧，

The mind’s *basic nature* is such that is benefited by rest and quiet.

The text is concerned with the dynamic essence of the mind, what underlies and dominates mental manifestations. *Xīn zhī qìng 情之性* must be read just like *wèi zhī qìng 物之性*, where the peculiar force of *qìng 情* is to raise us to a level below something manifest and familiar. And certainly, there is no way of interpreting this text as speaking of the “passions of the mind” or “the emotions in the mind”. The two meanings are manifestly distinct, and the distinction must have been clear to readers who were expected to understand this passage.

In the political philosophy of HANFEI, again, *qìng 情* is at the core of the intellectual *démarche*:

(13) HANFEI 14.05.01; Chen Qitian 219; Chen Qiyou 248; Zhou Xunhu 132; Zhu Shouliang 483

且夫世之愚學，
皆不知治亂之情，

The stupid ‘learned men’ of our time all fail to understand the *basic factors* involved in good government and chaos.

If we had read *zhì 質* here, we would have “the realities of good government and chaos”. But we read *qìng 情*, and so the discussion is of those underlying dynamic factors that bring about these political conditions. The stupid people are not so stupid that they cannot recognise the fact of good or bad government. What they do not understand is exactly what HANFEI sets out to uncover, namely those underlying essential structural factors that bring about good order or chaos. Within its proper realm of the political, HANFEI continues the essential enterprise of the Book of Changes.
The current alternation with shì 實 “facts, reality” is significant:

(14) HANFEI 14.05.04; Chen Qitian 219; Chen Qiyou 248; Zhou Xunchu 132; Zhu Shouliang 483

而聖人者，
審是而非之實，
察於治亂之情也。

But as for the sage,
he examines carefully the facts of
ingood
government and chaos.

Shì 實 refers to “objective facts” versus mere opinion or nomenclature. Qing 情 refers to the real underlying and operative factors and principles involved. In our context, then, this must count as a neat case of “metaphysical”, and it does not matter for my purpose that one does not normally use the word “metaphysical” in this sense. “The facts of right and wrong”, on the other hand, have nothing to do with underlying factors: here we have an abstract moral reality referred to, not any underlying principle. Hence the use of the non-metaphysical word shì 實.

Again, we find that the combination of qìng 情 with shì 實 “matter” is not coordinate in the grammatical sense:

(15) GUAN 46.01.146; ed. Dai Wang 3.59; tr. Rickett 1998:168

明主之治也，
審是非，
察事情，
以度量察之，

When the enlightened ruler
establishes good order,
he closely investigates right and
wrong
and finds out about the crucial
underlying principles of a matter,
using procedures and measures to
decide people.

Note the instructive contrast of qìng 情 “crucial determining factors/facts” versus shì fēi 是非 “what is right and wrong”. This is not a pleonastic or loose way of talking. GUAN keeps the dimensions of the merely factual or judgmental and the dimension of the explanatory apart.

Especially in mystical poetry, the metaphysical force of qìng 情 comes out very clearly:

(16) GUAN 49.04.03.01; ed. Dai Wang 2.100; tr. Rickett 1998:42

彼道之情，
惡音與聲。
修心靜音，

Those basic dynamic constitutive
features of the Way,
are averse to articulation in sound
and to fame.

Only after cultivating one’s mind
and quieting one’s urge to
articulate in sound
may the Way be comprehended.

In an interesting rhetorical act of personification this qìng 情 is credited with hatred for external expression. And then comes that crucial element of metaphysical cultivation, the human precondition for an appreciation of that realm: cultivation of the mind itself, the quieting down of the predominant urge to articulate (or, according to a widely accepted emendation of the text: the quieting down of the urge to plan things, yì 意).

What defines “metaphysical” qìng 情 is its opposition to mào 貌 “outer appearance”, even yán 言 “outer verbalisation”. These are mere huá 花 “outward flourishes” of what is inward, essential, and all-important:

(17) GY, jinyu:
吾見其貌而惡之，
聞其言而惡之。

夫貌，情之華也；
言，貌之機也。

When I see his shape I want him,
when I hear his speeches I dislike
him.

External manifestation is the
outward veneer of an inner reality;
speeches are a function of external
shape.

身為情，
言於中。

The person is the inner reality
and it forms within.

Speech is an outward adornment of
the person.
However we take this passage, it neither invites nor allows an interpretation of human qing 情 in terms of emotions or passions.

3. Political: Basic Popular Sentiments/Responses

The earliest passage from the old parts of SHU involves neither facts, nor any form of underlying metaphysical factors, but basic ways of responding to the world, basic dispositions and attitudes. I quote the passage with Karlgren's translation:

(18) SHU, Kanggao 6, tr. Karlgren

王曰
呼呼小将
痛痛乃身敬哉
民情大可見

The king said:
Oh, youthful Fēng,
(pain your body=) exert yourself intensely and be careful.

Heaven's majesty is not to be relied on (i.e. you cannot be sure of its favour).
The people's feelings are greatly visible (i.e. beware of signs of unrest).

Traditional commentators tend to agree (though they may all be wrong) that this refers to public sentiment and not to the objective real situation among the people. Whatever we end up saying about this famous passage, this conception “people's basic feelings” is important because it relates to the topology of “public space” in ancient China:

(19) ZHOU LI Dasitu 大司徒, SSJZJY p. 402

以六樂防萬民之情
而教之和。

Through the six kinds of music he keeps the basic instinctive responses of the people under control and teaches them to be harmonious.

And in this context, there certainly is no question of reading any “objective real situation”. Given this passage from ZHOU LI, one is then less inclined to go against the unanimous old tradition. Min qing 情 are basic inclinations, fundamental propensities, essential tendencies of the people. The term does not refer to emotions in general, but neither does it, in a psychologising way, refer to their subjective opinions. Let us turn to the discourse about qing 情 in historical prose.

There is, in any case, also an explicitly psychological variant to min qing 民情: ZUO Zhao 7.14 民心不壹 “People's minds are not one.”

Sometimes, qing 情 alone can refer to min qing 民情. In a political context, the fundamental responses of the people, their basic instinctive feelings about things are important:

(20) GUAN 53.01.56; ed. Dai Wang 3.10; tr. Rickett 1998:224

凡有天下者，
以情伐者帝，
以事伐者王，
以政伐者霸，

It is always so that in controlling the empire, those who rely on people's basic attitudes become emperors, those who rely on various undertakings become kings, those who rely on political power become lord protectors.

The basic attitudes are not here general instincts but current feelings.

In ZUO, there is frequent reference to the opposition between the real fundamental instincts of the people and pretense, and the pair qing wēi 情偽 is current in Warring States Chinese:

(21) ZUO XI 28.3 (632 B.C.); Yáng Bójùn 456; Wáng Shòuqīn et al. 333; tr. Watson 1989:56; compare also ZUO XI 28.3.

險阻艱難，
備嘗之矣；

He has tasted every kind of
hardship, trouble and danger, and the fundamental instinctive reactions and the (superficial) pretenses of the people he knows all about.

In Chūnqià fānlù 6, ed. Peking 1996 p. 103 we read that under the sage kings of antiquity in particular 民情至樸而不文 “the basic senti-
ments of the people were extremely plain and straightforward, and they were unpolished". Gassmann 1988: 68 translates plausibly: "die Gefühle der Menschen". In any case, there is no doubt that this passage refers to a certain historical stage and not to basic sentiments in general.

For min zhī qìng 民之情 we occasionally get tiān xià zhī qìng 天下之情:

(22) MO 16, ed. Wū Yūjiāng 1993: 177; tr. Watson 1963: 42f
是故言之而曰：「吾恐能為吾萬民之身若為吾身，
此豈非天下之情也。」
The partial ruler says,
"How could I possibly regard my countless subjects the same as I regard myself?"
That would be too much at variance with the fundamental natural instinctive reactions of the world."

Moreover, even the current rén qìng 人情 “fundamental human sensibilities”, which we shall discuss in detail below, deserves to be considered here. This essential dynamic nature must be properly tuned:

(23) GUAN 41.01.07; ed. Dai Wang 2.82; tr. Rickett 1998: 122
以律人情，
Pay attention to placing yourself in harmony with the five notes
And cultivate the twelve bells
so that they may become the pitch pipes for people’s basic instincts.

This refers to the people’s instincts at a given time. It does not refer to these instincts in general.

4. Anthropological: General Basic Instincts

For the theory of ritual, qìng 情 is again a keyword. The legitimisation of ritual is through the notion of qìng 情 “fundamental human sensibilities”.

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(24) LIJI 7; Couvreur 1.444f; Sün Xiđàn 5.85; tr. Legge 1.331
君子禮以飾情。
With a superior man the use of ceremonies is to embellish basic instinctive sentiments.

Whatever qìng 情 is, it is in some sense raw or instinctual and needs shì 飾 “beautification” through what in modern terms we would describe as “culture”. The process by which instinct gets informed by wén 文 “dignified patterning” is at the very core of Confucius’ educational project.

LIJI keeps insisting on that link with wén 文:

(25) LIJI 30; Couvreur 2.400f; Sün Xiđàn 13.2; tr. Legge 2.284
禮者，
The rules of propriety
因人之情
keep in accordance with the basic human instincts,
而為之節文，
and moderate and pattern them,
以為民坊也。
so they serve as dykes for the people.

Echoing Confucian thinking on ritual, HANFEI varies the point significantly:

(26) HANFEI 20.05:01; Chen Qiyou 331; Zhou Xunchu 184; Zhu Shoulüang 603
禮者，
Ritual
所以貌情也...
is that through which one gives outward expression to inner basic sensibilities...

In this connection HANFEI is not speaking of beatification, only of mào 貌, “giving expression to”; to him, lǐ 禮 is not the solution but part of the problem. A problem that must be solved not through moralising, but through political/social Machiavellian manipulation.

For LIJI ritual is a traditional expression of true inner feelings, but on the other hand, it is regularly construed as controlling, ordering and governing these feelings:
(27) LIJI 9; Couvreur 1.500f; Sūn Xidàn 6.32; tr. Legge 1.367

「大權，
先王以承天之道，
以治人之情。」

It was by those rules
that the ancient kings sought to
continue the ways of Heaven (on
earth),
and to regulate the basic human
instincts.

The use of the word zhi 治 does imply that the qing 情 are not by
their nature orderly or in good order: they need to be reduced to
order.

Significantly, ZHUANG replaces the more assertive and aggressive
zhi 治 “reduce to order, govern properly” with the much milder li 理
“get into a proper pattern, sort out in a principled way”. According to
ZHUANG one may and indeed should “sort out in a principled way”
one’s natural appetitive drives associated with likes and dislikes:

(28) ZHUANG 31.1239

子軍仁義之間，
察同異之際，
觀動靜之變，
遵受與之度，
理好惡之情，
和喜怒之節，
而幾於不免矣。

You, sir, inquire into the sphere of
humaneness and rectitude,
examine the boundary between
sameness and difference,
observe the transformations of
movement and stillness,
comply with measures for giving
and receiving,
adjust the basic instincts of liking
and disliking,
harmonize the rhythm of joy and
anger,
and yet you have barely been able
to escape all these troubles.

The essential appetitive features could, according to ZHUANG, not
only be adjusted in a principled way, they should also be contained,
and qing 情 can naturally be used in conjunction with yú 欲 “desire”:

(29) ZHUANG 33.13120

以禁攻藏兵為外，
以情欲寡淺為內。

They took the prohibition of
aggression and the halting of troops
as their external strategy,
reducing and moderating their
fundamental instinctive desires as
their internal strategy.

Here one begins to get close to a notion of qing 情 as “passion for”
which certainly comes to play an important part in later Chinese
intellectual history.

GUAN insists on qing 情 as something common:

(30) GUAN 3.8; ed. Dai Wang 1.9; tr. Rickett 1985, p. 95.

人情不二，
故民情可得而御也。

Human nature is all the same.

That is why it is possible to control
the people.2

審其所好惡，
則其長短可知也；

By examining their likes and
dislikes,
their strengths and weaknesses may
be known.

觀其交游，
則其賢不肖可察也。

By observing their associates,
their worthiness or unworthiness
may be learned.

Like HANFEI, GUAN notices that it is the very predictability of
qing 情 which gives the ruler a handle by which to control his subjects.
Without such predictability of basic responses his many subjects
could not be made to submit to one unified regulative regime.

In an almost modern spirit, Wáng Chóng reports that instincts are
also constant over time:

LUNHENG, ed. Lú Pánsú p. 163

世好奇怪，

That the world is fond of
outstanding and strange things

2 Deleting 情 as a mistaken repetition of the same character in the preceding
line [Chen, Yasui, and Tao].
古今同情。 is an instinct that is common to antiquity and modernity.

Our Warring States texts are not slow to describe what it is that all these constant instinctual responses qìng 情 have in common:

(31) GUAN 53.01.31; ed. Dai Wang 3.8; tr. Rickett 1998:219f
夫凡人之情，
見利莫能勿競，
見害莫能勿避。

这 ruler's task, then, is to use these natural instincts as his steering mechanisms in such a way that the people, steered by their instincts, come to do exactly what the ruler wants them to do. That is the essence of Warring States statecraft as expounded with exemplary clarity in HANFEI. On qìng 情 we read, entirely in line with GUAN:

(32) HANFEI 14.02.02; Chen Qitian 214; Chen Qiyou 245; Zhou Xunchu 127; Zhu Shouliang 474
夫安利者競之，
危害者去之，
此人之情也。

For political reasons HANFEI is interested in the natural basic human propensities or instincts, the appetitive base structure in human behaviour. A large number of passages discuss “human nature” in terms of qìng 情, and in every case it is important to note the crucial distinction with xìng 性 in being always appetitive in focus (xìng 性 can be appetitive, but does not have to be):

(33) HANFEI 38.02.03 [2]; Chen Qitian 347; Chen Qiyou 844; Zhou Xunchu 537; Zhu Shouliang 1418
人情皆喜貴 It is in the basic instinct of man that

they take open pleasure in high status
and dislike low status.

xìng 性 are the endowments, the natural qualities, the stative natural disposition. Qìng 情 is the set of dynamic tendencies. No wonder we have much talk of “human nature being basically good” in terms of xìng 性 and not qìng 情.

(34) HANFEI 10.09.10; Chen Qitian 676; Chen Qiyou 194; Zhou Xunchu 95; Zhu Shouliang 400
人之情不愛其子，
今成其子以為膳於君，
其子弗愛，
又安能愛君乎？

It is in the essential instinct of men that they all take good care of their children,
but now he broiled his son in order to make a delicacy for his ruler:
his own son he would not take
good care of,
how can he go on to take good care of his ruler?

(35) HANFEI 10.09.06; Chen Qitian 676; Chen Qiyou 194; Zhou Xunchu 95; Zhu Shouliang 400
管仲曰：
“不可。
夫人性不愛其身。

Guàn Zhōng said:
“He is not acceptable.
It is in the natural instinct of man
that they all take good care of their own bodies.

公妒而好內，

You being a jealous man, and fond of women

騾刁自縛以為治內。
Shù Diāo castrated himself in order to administer the harem.
Even his own body he does not
take good care of,
how is he going to go on to take
good care of his ruler?”

In all these cases, what is discussed is anthropology, the basic human instinctive reactions or responses to things.
ROLE-SPECIFIC INSTINCTS
In particular, the underlying appetitive base structure of ministers' and rulers' behaviour, their basic natural structurally motivated instincts are of great concern in HANFEI, since they form the very basis of his Machiavellian theory:

(36) HANFEI 19.06:07; Chen Qitian 211; Chen Qiyou 311; Zhou Xunchu 178; Zhu Shouliang 589
害身而利國，
Harming his personal interests to
profit the state
臣弗為也；
is something the ministers will
臣弗為也；
refuse to do;
害國而利臣，
harming the state to profit his
君不行也。
is something the ruler will not do.
臣之憲，
The minister's basic feeling is
害身無利；
that to harm one's person is not
君之憲，
profitable;
害國無親。
the ruler's basic instinct is

Like one's inborn nature xing 性, qing 情 cannot be learnt, but unlike xing 性 it can be individuated and counted:

(37) LIJ 9; Couvreur 1.516f; Sün Xidān 6.52f; tr. Legge 1.379; cf. also JIAYU 32 ed. Xuē Ánquín 1993: 203
何謂人情？
What are the fundamental responses of men?
喜怒哀彌愛惡欲，
They are joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking.
七者，
These seven feelings
弗學而能。
belong to men without their

... 故聖人所以治人七情，
Hence, when a sage (ruler) would regulate the seven fundamental responses of men,

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修十義…
cultivate the ten virtues that are right...

What is counted here is not individual events, individual bouts of anger etc., but kinds of feelings.

ZHUANG, like many other texts, links instincts to organs:

(38) ZHUANG 29.1187
今吾問子以人之情，
Now, sir, I shall tell you about the fundamental instincts of man.
日欲視色，
The eyes desire to see colours;
耳欲聽聲，
the ears desire to hear sounds;
口欲嘗味，
the mouth desires to taste flavours;
志氣欲盈。
the aspirations and vital breath desire fulfilment.

In HSWZ the dimensions of man's appetitive essential drives are countable kinds of qing 情:

(39) HSWZ 05.16:01; tr. Hightower 1951, p. 175
人有六情，
Man has six fundamental instincts.
日欲視好色，
His eyes desire to see good-looking colors.
耳欲聞宮商，
his ears desire to hear [the notes] kung and shang,
嗅欲嗅芳香，
his nose desires to smell fragrant odors;
口欲嘗甘旨，
his mouth desires to taste fine flavors,
其身體四肢欲安而不作，
his four limbs desire repose and inactivity;
衣欲被文絨而輕暖。of clothing he likes the elegant and embroidered, the light and warm.

此六者，
These six are
民之六情也。
the six fundamental instincts of the people.

失之則亂，
Neglecting them results in trouble;
從之則穆。acting in accord with them, in harmony.
故聖王之教其民也，
必因其情而節之以禮，
必從其欲而制之以義。

Hence the Saintly King, in
instructing the people,
always makes a point of following
their instincts, employing ritual to
restrain them;
he accords always with their
wishes, using rectitude to control
them.

義簡而備，
Rectitude being simple and
complete,
禮易而法，
ritual being easy and regulated,
去情不遠，
and not departing far from
fundamental instincts,
故民之從命也速。
the people as a result obey orders
quickly.

Again, we are dealing with six kinds of desire, not six events or
instances of desiring something.

(40) LIJ 2, Xiǎo Dēngfù 1990: 108ff
五情爽惑。
His five appetitive drives were all
in confusion.

This refers to the affective relationship with the outer world of ears,
eyes, nose, mouth and touch. The matter is taken up again in

(41) LIJ 7
五情好惡，
The five fundamental instincts,
likes and dislikes,
古猶今也。
are the same in antiquity and in
present times.

Public opinion may change through time as a result of good or bad
government. General basic instincts do not change so easily in this
way, but still, they are something that government and education can
set to work on and cultivate. What is basic in man as instincts and
fundamental propensities is amenable to cultivation, cultural formation,
like a field of cultural action:

(42) LIJ 9; Couvreur 1.522; Sūn Xīdān 6.57; tr. Legge 1.383
故聖人作則，
必以天地為本，
以陰陽為端，
以四時為柄，
以日星為紀，
月以為量，
鬼神以為徒，
五行以為質，
禮義以為器，
人情以為田，
四靈以為畜。
Thus when the sages would
make rules (for men),
they felt it necessary to find the
origin (of all things) in heaven and
earth;
to make the two forces (of nature)
the commencement (of all);
to use the four seasons as the
handle (of their arrangements);
to adopt the sun and stars as the
recorders (of time),
the moon as the measurer (of work
to be done),
the spirits breathing (in nature) as
associates,
the five elements as giving
substance (to things),
rules of propriety and righteousness
as (their) instruments,
the basic sensibilities of men as a
field to cultivate,
and the four intelligent creatures as
domestic animals to be reared.

The thought is not only eagerly repeated in other texts like JIAYU, it
is also eagerly elaborated upon in LIJ itself:

(43) LIJ 9; Couvreur 1.529ff; Sūn Xīdān 6.61f; tr. Legge 1.388
故人情者，
聖王之田也。
Those basic sensibilities of men
were the field to be cultivated by
the sage kings.
修禮以耕之，
They fashioned the rules of
ceremony to plough it.
陳義以種之，
They set forth the principles of
righteousness with which to plant
it.
They instituted the lessons of the school to weed it.

They made love the fundamental subject by which to gather all its fruits, and they employed the training in music to give repose (to the minds of learners).

Emotions can otherwise come to be something one can become an unworthy servant of:

(44) HSWZ 02.24:04; tr. Hightower 1951, p. 64
巫馬期則不然。 Wū Mǎqì however did not do this.

He misused his own nature and was a slave of his basic sentiments, putting his effort into instructions and orders.

Although there was order, there was not perfection.

5. Positive:
Essential Sensibilities and Sentiments, Viewed as Commendable

At times there is a specific humanistic tinge to ZHUANG’s use of the word that has reverberated through the millennia of Chinese civilisation:

(45) ZHUANG 1.24
吾聞之於接耳，
大而無當，
往而不返。
吾驚怖其言，
猶河漢而無極也：

“I have heard Jié Yù speak. His words are impressive but not to the point. Once he goes off on a tangent, he never comes back. I was astounded by his words that were limitless as the Milky Way.

大有遠庭，
不近人情焉。

They were extravagant and remote from basic human sensibilities."

Xici 稷辞, the appended explanations in YI also provide an intellectual context where the abstract consideration of qìng 情 in a more individuated, more psychologising different sense comes to the fore, and this meaning is not represented in the older parts of the book:

交象動乎內，
吉凶見乎外，
功業見乎變，
聖人之情見乎辭。

As the lines and the images move within the hexagrams, so do good fortune and misfortune appear outside them, meritorious undertakings are revealed in change, and the basic meanings of the sages are revealed in the attached phrases.

What is referred to in this context is not, I think, some innate fundamental instinct of the sages, but a personal and creative profound and fundamental response based on the superior sensibility of a sage. It is as if qìng 情 begins to be individuated: your qìng 情 is not quite like my qìng 情. The sage has a special qìng 情 characterised by a higher perceptiveness regarding what is fundamental. One is getting generically close to the qìng 情 celebrated in Chū 楚 poetry, and of which I shall give a detailed account below. However, there is a difference: the deeply-felt feelings of the sage are, surely, irrelevant here. The attached phrases are not an expression of individual sensibilities of this sage or that. They are not an expression of emotional responses at all. What YI argues, if I understand this correctly, is that these formulations bring out the very essence of the wisdom that makes a sage into a sage. Unlike the Chū poetry, the attached phrases in the YI are not acts of individual communication. They are a general formulation of what is essential.

What exactly is referred to in the following, is a matter of understandable dispute:
(47) ZHUANG 5.197

Since he (i.e. the sage) receives sustenance from heaven, what use has he for man?
He has a human form, but is without the basic human instincts.

Like Heaven, the sage is non-human, non-humane, lacks the essential sensibilities that make man human. This is Nietzsche speaking to us, through ZHUANG.

The art of living even of the Confucian gentleman is that of identifying with that innermost constitutive and basically positively valued psychological sensibility that defines one’s identity:

(48) LIJI 19; Couvreur 2.75f; Sun Xidān 10.42f; tr. Legge 2.110

Hence the gentleman reverts to his basic instincts
in order to bring his will into harmony with them...

This example belongs here because the heavy focus is on the positive valuation of the sensibilities in question, and not, as in the category I call “anthropological”, to a neutrally viewed general biological and instinctual feature.

It turns out that qīng 情 is crucial in defining one’s basic moral personal identity. In poetry, we shall see, it is through qīng 情 that the poet celebrates the discovery of his emotional identity.

Compare:

(49) CHUCHI QIJIAN 05.03; SBBY 422; Huang 217; Fu 198; tr. Hawkes 253

And all men, in the end, revert to their true natures.

It does seem, here, that Hawkes’ translation hits the mark in this context.

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The comparison is between the external things and the internal dynamic essence of a person is current:

(50) GUAN 52.01.23; ed. Dai Wang 3.3; tr. Rickett 1998:206f

When he met King Wu of the Zhou,
he subsequently became a captive of the Zhou house.
This is to be preoccupied with material things and to lose one’s true nature.
to find happiness in licentious pleasure and forget the disasters to follow.

Moreover, one’s basic sound instincts are constitutive and basic to the concept of the person, they are, as it were, the essence of a person:

(51) GUAN 38.12.03; ed. Dai Wang 2.73; tr. Rickett 1998: 96

Therefore I say:
If one wishes to care for one’s body,
one must first come to understand one’s basic instincts.

The opposition between one’s qīng 情 “inner essence, basic inner feelings” and shén 神 “spirit” is important:

(52) HANFEI 20.37.5; Chen Qiyou 384; Zhu Shouliang 669; Zhou Xunchu 209; m189

He is all concentrated on his inner instinctual essence,
even if there is something of the kind he is fond of,
his spirit is not moved by it.

The realisation of these quintessentially human inner feelings is the consummation of the true Confucian life, and here LIJI employs qīng 情
QING IN PRE-BUDDHIST CHINESE

6. Personal: Basic Motivation/Attitude

Under the heading I have labelled POLITICAL, I have collected examples where the reference is to collective attitudes. Under the heading PERSONAL, I will discuss individual personal attitudes and motivations of all kinds, where the focus is on individual difference rather than on the shared political attitude. There are occasions where qing 情 come to be fundamental or crucial sentiments, or innermost defining attitudes that are constitutive of one's personal identity:

(56) ZUO Wen15.4 (612 B.C.); Yáng Bojūn 611; Wáng Shòuqìan et al. 449; tr. Legge 271

情難不同，

Although they may have different basic sentiments,

毋絕其愛，

they do not abandon the relative affection

親之道也。

which should subsist between them.

Here we are clearly dealing with the individuated qing 情 which differs from one person to another, as we saw in the case of the qing 情 of the sages in Y1. The difference between these two men is one neither of metaphysical essence, nor of biological/physical constitution, it is a difference in the fundamental psychological reaction or response to the world. The term qing 情 has clearly moved into the psychological sphere, though it is still not gânqìng 感情 “feeling” in an ephemeral and purely emotional sense.

Nothing is more disastrous than the perversion of true basic inner attitude into something that itself is not in good faith, inwardly and essentially false:

(53) LIJI 35; Couvrer 2.555f; Sūn Xīdān 13.65; tr. Legge 2.377

故哭泣無時，

Therefore he wailed and wept, without regard to time;

服勤三年，

he endured the toil and grief for three years.

思慕之心，

His heart of loving thoughts showed the aspirations of the filial son,

孝子之志也，

and was the real expression of his true human instincts.

禮義之經也，

the proper method of propriety and rectitude.

非從天降也，

It does not come from heaven,

非從地出也，

it does not come from the earth;

人情而已矣。 情

it is simply the expression of the true human instincts.

That Confucian ideal involves the establishment of what is elegant and proper in deep accord with the constitutive inner sensibilities:

(54) LIJI 38; Couvrer 2.580; Sūn Xīdān 13.84; tr. Legge 2.391

三年之喪何也？

What purpose do the mourning rites for three years serve?

曰：

The different rules for the mourning rites were established in harmony with true human instincts.

Even in the most cosmological of contexts, the relation of ritual to human sensibilities is stressed:

(55) LIJI 49; Couvrer 2.697f; Sūn Xīdān 14.63; tr. Legge 2.465

凡禮之大體，

All ceremonial usages looked at in their great characteristics are the embodiment of (the ideas suggested by) heaven and earth;

體天地，

take their laws from the (changes of the) four seasons;

則陰陽，

imitate the (operations of the) contracting and developing movements in nature;

順人情，

and are in conformity with the true instincts of man.

故謂之禮。

That is why this is called propriety.
The collocation of *yi*意 “intentions” with *qing* 情 is not incidental in ZGC.

In HANFEI the word currently refers to the real propensities or basic convictions of the ruler which one might try to spy out, and which the ruler should take care not to disclose:

Now if the powerful ministers are fierce dogs and bite freemen who have a Way to offer, and if one’s aides again are rats in the altar of the land and spy on the ruler’s *real feelings*, without the ruler being aware of what is happening, if things get to this stage, then how can the ruler avoid being blocked and how can the state fail to be ruined?

In contexts like these *qing* 情 comes close to meaning “ultimate real motives, underlying motives”.

---

Note that he is not interested in the man’s erotic inclinations but in secret underlying and operative feelings.

7. Emotional: Individual Deep Convictions, Responses, Feelings

Finally, we must turn to those cases where the semantic focus is not just on sentiment and attitude, but where the emotional charge becomes the semantic core of the word. Attitudes may be construed as dispositions to act, sensibilities as dispositions to feel, whereas emotions are not dispositions but certain heightened states of psychological excitement, often transitory, sometimes lasting. The relevant examples to be discussed here, though never unrelated to other categories, constitute a highly distinct set by themselves. It is tempting to call this category “lyric”, but this would confuse the issue by conflating genre theory with semantics.

There is a profusion of examples in this section for two reasons: one is that it seems to me these passages illustrate a crucial link with later conceptual developments, and the other is that in these examples the reader will find a wealth of semantic resonances with the other categories we have discussed. This illustrates a self-evident but nonetheless important point: My classification of clusters of meaning very obviously cannot and must not be taken to exclude semantic resonance between the categories I set up. There are not only the obvious overlapping borderline cases, and the cases of probably intended suspended
ambiguity between categories, there are also the cases where several categories of meaning are contemporaneously focussed, but to clearly different degrees. These are the semantic resonances that are so crucial not only for poetry, but also for artistic prose.

The ultimate source music is true inner feeling, according to LIJU:

(61) LIJU 19; Couvreur 2.47f; Sün Xidán 10.20; tr. Legge 2.93
凡音者，
All modulations of the voice
生人心也。
spring from the minds of men.
情動於中，
when emotions are moved within,
故形於聲。 
they are manifested in the sounds
聲成文，
and when those sounds are
謂之音。 
comprised so as to form

What moves or is perturbed, here, is not instincts, certainly not what some might want to call “the emotional hard-wiring”. The reference is to a heightened state of emotion. At the same time we know that this heightened state of emotion may very well be presented as endemic in a population and as ultimately political in nature. The word is often overdetermined.

The emotional state may be one of emotional sensibility, and one might even be tempted think of qíng情 as referring to the organ of such emotional sensibility, in analogy with the organ of taste, kǒu 口 “the mouth”. The opposition with jīng精 “subtle spirits” is not common, and certainly the idea of “gratifying one’s instincts” is unusual in pre-Buddhist literature. The passage is worth dwelling on:

(62) HANFEI 08.01.01; Chen Qitian 696; Chen Qiyou 121; Zhou Xunchu 61; Zhu Shoulüang 322

天有大命，
Heaven and Nature have their
人有大命。
mandated fixed rule system,
夫香美脆味，
Aromatic delicacies and crisp tidbits,
厚酒肥肉，
thick undiluted wine and fat meat,

Those that succeed in the world:
甘口而疾形：
these are sweet to the mouth but harmful to the body;
曼理皓齒，
delicate features and white teeth,
説情而捐精，
these will gratify one’s basic sensibilities but impair one’s subtle spirits.

The reference, here, is to erotic sensibilities. That much is clear. And there is no doubt that these erotic sensibilities are referred to by qíng情. But at the same time the reference to these sensibilities is generic, certainly prosaic, and not lyrical in any sense of the word.

SHUOYUAN singles out the expressive function as defining language:

(63) SHUOYUAN 8.10


夫言者
As for words,

所以抒其胸
they are means whereby to dredge

而發其情者也。
out what is in one’s breast
and to bring out one’s inner

feelings.

What is brought out here is important emotionally charged content, an emotional response to things, something one is emotionally committed to. That is what one huái 怀 “bears” in one’s chest. And note again that this is not a lyrical text. This is a prosaic reference to emotional content.

Prose passages like these are not so many. But also in philosophical texts, the specific emotionally charged convictions of certain outstanding individuals can be focussed on, in an entirely unpoetic manner:

(64) HANFEI 26.03.11; Chen Qitian 798; Chen Qiyou 492; Zhou Xunchu 284; Zhu Shoulüang 860

通貴、育之之情。
They thoroughly understand the basic convictions of Bēn and Yù, 
不以死易生：
but they will not barter away their lives for death.

感於強烈之貪。
They may be confused by the same greed as Robber Zhī,
不以财易身：
但他们不会让他们的
为的财产。

則守國之道卽必須。
And then the way of safeguarding
国家是完全的。

The reference here is to a strongly emotionally charged commitment,
not just to instinct or attitude. Again, the reference is to something
stable and general. This is not an episodic noun, a reference to a

tensed transitory emotional state.

In poetry, the world of innermost feelings articulated by the poet
is a paradigmatic subject defining the poet's enterprise in CHUCI.
They are kept in one's breast, but will out:

(65) CHUCI LISA0 01:63; SBBY 57; Jin 98; Huang 20; Fu 41; tr.
Hawkes 75; You 342; tr. CH

#### Deep in the palace,

不以財易身：

哲王又不顧。

The wise king slumbers and will
not be awakened;

懷朕情而不發兮,

I keep my innermost concerns in
my breast and do not let them out -
how can I endure this to the end of
my days?

The reference, here as typically, is generically to one's deepest current
emotionally charged moral commitments. What signals the emotional
charge involved is the word 小 小 “let out”: The emotional charge
needs an outlet.

And yet, there is a need to dredge out this emotionally charged
content, to 小 小 (sometimes written 小) scrape the bottom of what
there is 小 小 in "deep inside, innermost", and it is important to
realise that this word is in no way limited to lyrical contexts. In fact
it is also used by the Mohist logicians.

(66) CHUCI AISHIMING 01:01; SBBY 442; Huang 229; Fu 209; tr.
Hawkes 263

志損恨而不遏兮,

My mind is full of resentment
that finds no outlet.

One's innermost feelings invite 小 小 “scrutiny”, make a claim to
veracity which deserves to investigated, and when exposed, these
innermost feelings, honestly expressed, are opposed to the slander of
others. While one is inclined to take the focus to be on these innermost,
highly charged emotions, there is a strong link in this case, as indeed
in many others, to a secondary focus on earnest political conviction
and motivation. Quite often it is as if the emotional load and the
intense commitment is superimposed on what is basically our category
5: PERSONAL.

To the poets of CHUCI that innermost constitutive sensibility and
these essential defining sentiments are at the core of their poetic
self-choreography or stance as poets, it defines their poetic persona:
The hyperbole of the poet spending all night expectorating strikes one as epigonc, exhibitionist. The expectoration has become a standard poetic pose.

A typical way in which the emotional charge of the feelings, as dredged out, comes out in the imagery of fragrance:

The innermost feelings, like the habitually present pent-up wrath, and the general sorrows sung will out: through poetry or in interaction with friends.

The result of poetic expectoration is a form of miăn 免 "release":

"By unburdening my heart in verse, I hoped I might escape..."
The artistic articulation of these sentiments through language, their formulation into words, becomes something of an emotional obsession later in the same poem:

(76) CHUCI JIUZHANDG 04:07; SBBY 225; Jin 512; Huang 95; Fu 106; tr. Hawkes 167

And when I unlocked these thoughts of mine and put them into words,

The Fragrant One feigned deafness and would not listen to them.

What David Hawkes translates as "thoughts" are clearly heavily charged, emotionally.

Typically, qing "情" refers to intense worries, and they can be xié "写" "written out":

(77) CHUCI JIUSI 08:06; SBBY 568; Huang 307; Fu 262; tr. Hawkes 317

Obsessed with smothering griefs, I have no way of venting my feelings.

In another poem of the same series these innermost emotional and moral responses are celebrated as wēi 微 "subtle":

(78) CHUCI JIUZHANDG 04:03; SBBY 223; Jin 508; Huang 95; Fu 105; tr. Hawkes 167

I would like to rise up and fly to him unbidden,

But seeing how others have fared, I restrain myself,

And instead I have set out my secret thoughts and put them into verse,

And offer them up to lay before the Fair One.

Setting forth in sound poetic order what is constitutive of one's poetic personal identity becomes a routine:

(79) CHUCI JIUZHANDG 07:10; SBBY 249; Jin 600; Huang 109; Fu 117; tr. Hawkes 177

I wished to set forth my thoughts and explain my actions:

I little dreamed that this would be held a crime.

But even without successful publication of one's deepest sentiments, these retain an absolute value that is "more eternal than bronze":

(80) CHUCI JIUZHANDG 06:09; SBBY 242; Jin 570; Huang 105; Fu 114; tr. Hawkes 174; tr. CH

If my innermost convictions and inner substance keep their integrity, Though I dwell unseen and obscure, my fame can yet be bright.

I believe qing "情" is being epegektically explained by zhi 質 "inner substance". The poet's inner sensibilities and moral convictions define his very material substance.

Along with this fragrance, the poet thrives on the purity of his basic emotional responses:

(81) CHUCI QIJIAN 06:01; SBBY 426; Huang 220; Fu 200; tr. Hawkes 254

I mourn that my lot was cast in an unfit time;

I grieve for the many woes of the land of Chī.

My nature was one of spotless purity,

But I fell on a time of disorder and met with disgrace.

The jié bāi "pristine purity" of this inner emotional response contrasts naturally with the dirty outside world.
In this kind of poetry, the feelings become even proper grammatical subjects, almost agents in the same poem:

(82) CHUCI JIUZHANG 01:06; SBBY 201; Jin 446; Huang 83; Fu 95; tr. Hawkes 157

情沈抑而不達兮，
又蔽而莫之白也。

My feelings were stifled and could not find expression,
For they screened me from my lord,
that I might not explain myself.

In this way, the heart and the emotions become a natural pair in parallelism:

(83) CHUCI JIUTAN 05:07; SBBY 513; Huang 272; Fu 238; tr. Hawkes 293

心懸愍以冤結兮，
情懸懸以曼憂。

My mind is distracted and in a turmoil;
My feelings disordered and full of bitter grief.

So far, I have discussed what I consider some main strains of meanings of the word *qing* 情 as I understand them. It will be obvious to everyone that one could easily have doubled the categories established. I have not found it natural to do this.

Similarly, one could have used the manifest overlap between the categories I established to collapse several groups into subgroups. I have considered this, but I have come to the conclusion that it would not add anything new to the analysis.

However, all these meanings will get into proper focus when one considers the relations of contrast and of antonymy into which the word can be seen to enter. In the appendix that follows I shall consider these contrasting relationships.

At first sight, one may object that the antonyms I introduce get unreasonably cursory treatment. But there are two reasons for this brevity which will be obvious enough to those who have worked with synonym dictionaries:

1. The relations of antonymy and of semantic adjacency obtain not between words as such, but between meanings of words only.

Thus, in principle, there is no need to lay out the meanings of the words compared in all their detail.

2. There is, of course, not the space to present a detailed analysis along the lines I have presented for *qing* 情 for all the words below. (On the other hand there is space for this in the *Thesaurus Linguarum Sericarum* (TLS): An Historical and Critical Encyclopaedia of Chinese Conceptual Schemes [under construction], parts of which are about to be made available on the Internet.)

Appendix: Synonyms and Antonyms

Among the semantically adjacent concepts relevant to a proper delineation of the contrasts which define the meaning of *qing* 情 I find it useful to list the following. Needless to say each and every one of the terms I here refer to need and deserve much more detailed treatment than they can get here.

I deal with these terms only in so far as they seem to me to throw direct light on the problems of *qing* 情 discussed in this paper.

愛 “loving care for, love” is one of the profound basic responses designated by *qing* 情, and there are times when *qing* 情 seems — in context — genuine deep-seated affection. None the less it remains to be emphasised that while *qing* 情 may occasionally so discreetly refer to genuine feelings (for someone), the word never refers concretely to any of the other emotions like anger and so on. Thus there does seem to be a special semantic affinity between *qing* 情 and love. If there were more examples like the following very puzzling passage, we should have to introduce a new semantic category for it in our above account:

(84) SHI 136; tr. Karlgren

尚有情兮，
而無望兮。

I certainly have love (for you),
but no admiration.

Here it seems all commentators simply take it for granted that *qing* 情 means something like “affection”. Xiäng Xi 1997 (new expanded edition) provides no alternative glosses to this. There are no textual
variants. Whatever we say about qìng 情: the earliest occurrence of the word involves emotion and comes in a love poem.

chéng 誠 “earnestness” is not an innate or instinctive matter, and it does not typically involve a reaction to the outside world, but comes close to qìng 情 “fundamental and instinctively based deep commitment”. The two words concur in their emphasis on the genuineness of the commitment, but qìng 情 is more outward-directed in its meaning, whereas chéng 誠 belongs rather with xìng 性 in referring to a primarily internal quality as such rather than to a relation to outward things. Used adjectively, qìng 情 is very close to chéng 誠 “genuine” in meaning:

(85) HANFEI 33.27:02 [35]; Chen Qitian 540; Chen Qiyou 697; Zhu Shouliang 1209; Zhou Xunchu 424
主不察其情實，
If you, my lord, do not carefully examine the essential facts of the matter
坐而恀之，
but sit around and worry about them，
馬猶不肥也。
then the horses will still not get any fatter for it.

duān 端 “basic impulse” is subtly and autogenously psychological and describes the very source from which developed the more responsive and appetitive qìng 情 “basic attitudes, fundamental responses; basic motives”. Duān 端 in MENG are incipient sensibilities rather than full-fledged instincts like qìng 情. None the less, like qìng 情 they are typically hidden, as in HF 5.2.15 端其端 “hide one’s motives”. Thus in two of its meanings duān 端 competes with qìng 情.

(86) HANFEI 07.03:06; Chen Qitian 183; Chen Qiyou 112; Zhou Xunchu 56; Zhu Shouliang 314
人臣之情非必
As for the minister’s real attitudes, he is by no means necessarily
能愛其君也，
able to show loving care for the ruler.

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為重利之故也，
and the reason is he acts to maximise his advantage.
今人主不察其情，
Now if the ruler does not cover up his real attitudes
不置其端，
and does not hide his basic motives,
而使人臣有緣
if he brings it about that the ministers have something to go on
以侵其主，
and thus to encroach on the ruler’s authority,
則群臣為子之，田常
then for the various ministers to become Zigis and Tián Chángs
不難矣。
is not a hard thing to accomplish.

li 理 “principle” is an individualised and specified constitutive feature of things of any kind, and the word does not normally, like qìng 情, relate to a dynamic response or to the appetitive or emotional features of living creatures; moreover li 理 is not typically conceived as something potentially hidden by a person, although the li 理 of something may be hard to find out. One’s principles are, typically, a matter of one’s own choice, and keeping to them is a matter of pertinacity:

(87) GUAN 36.01.57; ed. Dai Wang 2.65; tr. Rickett 1998:80
惡不失其理，
In dislikes one does not lose sight of principles,
欲不過其情，
in desiring one does not exceed fundamental instincts.

But music does not appeal to the ephemeral or occasional. It is concerned with what is quintessential in man’s inner sensitivities:

(88) LIJH 19; Couvreur 2.83f; Sün Xiànián 10.48f; tr. Legge 2.114
樂也者，
Music
情之不可變者也。 is an expression of basic
禮也者，
Ritual
invariable sensibilities.
It is clear that there is less emotional content in 裏理 and it is therefore not at all interchangeable with 情 qing.

Basic, constant and unwarped sound human instincts are 情 qing and naturally contrast with the 裏理 “principle” of things:

(89) GUAN 36.01.39; ed. Dai Wang 2.64; tr. Rickett 1998:77
義者，
義德守其宜也。“Duty”
義理 visitor refers to doing what is appropriate
while fulfilling the inherent
procedures and
means of expression for them.

The opposition here with that other metaphysical term 裏理 “principles”
is significant here: for the principles are just those specified dynamic
essential features of things that make them into what they are.

móu 謀 “plan” is articulated and typically even explicitly verbalised;
it differs neatly from 情 qing “basic attitude, disposition to act” as well as from qíng 情 “basic instinctive response, instinctive urge”
where there is no focus on articulation. Thus a 情 qing may be the
basis for a móu 謀 but not vice versa. Thus although these two words
do not belong to the same synonym group, they are in this specific
sense semantically adjacent. A single example suffices to illustrate
the point:

(90) HF 34.26.03 [37]; Chen Qiyou 581; Chen Qiyou 745; Zhu Shoul-
iang 1285; Zhou Xunchu 461; trm 390

When one assesses the closeness of our relation
then it was that between a son and a mother.

And yet, she would be sure to
discuss matters with Mummy Cái.

Now as for my relation to the rulers of states
it is not as close as that between a son and a mother,
and rulers all have their Mummy Cái.

qi 氣 “vital spirits, vital energies, energies, force” are typically
part of a physical aetiology of symptoms or appearances, or of purely
physical development, unlike 情 qing “fundamental instincts”, which
is nowhere conceived as distinctly predicated on some physical base.
There is an interesting collocation of these 情 qing “instincts” with qi
氣 “vital spirits”:

(92) GUAN 53.01.24; ed. Dai Wang 3.8; tr. Rickett 1998:219; mod

One does not use less effort
不為無益之事，
故意定
而不常氣情，
氣情不常，
則耳目覷。
衣食足。

The reference here is to the basic material and physical endowments linked to qi 氣 but differing from it by being conceived in a non-material—we might say metaphysical—way.

(93) HSWZ 01:20:04; tr. Hightower 1951, p. 28; cf. SHUOYUAN 18.12
故不肖者精化始具，
而生性感動，
觸情縱欲...

shên 神 “spirit” is primarily physical, more cosmological and mystical than emotional, as I hope to document in a detailed study elsewhere. At this point I will just briefly summarise what is immediately relevant to interpretation of qìng 情. Meanwhile, the reader is referred to Michael Puett’s stimulating account of the evolution of the word shên 神 in his recent book To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinisation in Early China (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 2002).

One passage in ZHUANG forces us to address three adjacent terms:

(94) ZHUANG 25.1018
遮其天，
離其性，
滅其情，
亡其神，
以眾為。

They hide from Heaven, they deviate from their inborn nature, they destroy their fundamental instincts, they annihilate their spirit, for their multifarious activities.

Heaven covers all and determines all, but as for people nowadays, they hide from it. Heaven is the source of xìng 性, hence the common formula 天性 “inborn nature from Heaven”. One’s inborn nature is malleable, but they deviate from it. Xìng 性 refers to the state in which one is born into this world and refers primarily to static properties rather than dynamic tendencies. One’s fundamental instincts constitute the dynamic aspect of one’s very identity. Shén 神 “spirit” refers to the substantially conceived fine substance that one expends, wastes, or even annihilates.

(95) CHUCHI JIUTAN 02:08; SBBY 495; Huang 262; Fu 232; tr. Hawkes 287
情恍忽以忘歸兮，
神浮遊以高躍。
心蠶蝁而懷顧兮，
魂眷眷而獨逝。

My mind is distraught; I forget where I am going; My soul goes wandering off, high into the air; The heart within me yearns in sadness; My longing spirit speeds on its way alone.

There is some very good reason why David Hawkes was tempted to use “mind” for qìng 情 here insofar as the mind is what can change and be upset, unlike “fundamental instincts”. In this passage we have four mental terms: the qìng 情 “basic emotional state” (see our category 2) is disoriented; the shên 神 “spirits”, like a subtle physical substance, have left the body and risen high; the xìn 心 “heart” is contrite with nostalgia; and the hún 魂 “heavenly soul” is about to gain its own independent existence and speeds off all on its own.
shi 質 “reality” is non-dynamic and refers to the facts as they are in themselves rather than, like qing 情 to the facts as basic factors shaping the appearance of things or their development.

(96) XINYU 3, ed. Wáng Liqí, 55
惟應知其實，
仲尼見其情。

The point is Yáo understood the facts,
but Confucius saw the crucial underlying factors.

shi fēi 是非 “right or wrong, truth of a matter” is abstract and theoretical, describing what might or might not be truthfully said about something, and it differs from qing 情 “fundamental dynamic factors” which refers to what it is in things that might make statements true.

(97) HF 47.09:02; Chen Qitian 147; Chen Qiyou 976; Zhou Xunchu 640; Zhu Shouliang 1632
治國是非，
不以衡斷
而決於寵人，
則臣下輕君
而重於寵人矣。

If the rights and wrongs in governing the state are not judged according to professional skill but are determined by favourites then ministers and subordinates will take the ruler lightly and they will regard the favourites as important.

shi 事 “undertaking, matter” is primarily a human undertaking (which is never ever qing 情), but can by extension refer to any external macrocosmic manifestly real event, and in that meaning it differs clearly from qing 情 “crucial or determining dynamic factors of a situation, the basic facts”.

shi 嘴 “craving, desire” is always negative and specific, not innate or generally instinctive like qing 情.

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(98) HF 20.31.05; Chen Qiyou 371; Zhu Shouliang 654; Zhou Xunchu 203
嗜慾無限，
動靜不節，
則傷疽之爪害之。

Typically, it is the very arbitrariness of the craving that is focussed by shi 嘴:

(99) HF 39.12[12]; Chen Qitian 373; Chen Qiyou 882; Zhu Shouliang 1465; Zhou Xunchu 567; Liao 2.197
屈到嗜婪，
文王嗜菖蒲蒭。
非正味也。
而二賢尚之，
所味不必美。

Qū Dào was addicted to water chestnuts. King Wén was addicted to calamus minced meats. It is not as if these things had the correct taste, but the two men of talent prizd them highly. What one has a taste for is not necessarily objectively beautiful.

shi 勢 “constellation of power” refers to the overall external and manifest distribution of power, and it differs from qing 情 which firstly does not particularly concentrate on the distribution of power, and which secondly is about a variety of basic underlying factors rather than specifically manifest position of power.

(100) HF 30.31:03; Chen Qiyou 550; Zhou Xunchu 322; Zhu Shouliang 953
此知必勝之勢也。

In this way he made sure the constellation was one bound to lead to victory.
"private matters, personal feelings and personal affairs" can be used as an adjective for qing 情 in Han prose, but such combinations I have not found in pre-Han literature:

(101) SHUIJ 126/3199 tr. Dolby/Scott 1974, p. 161
若朋友交遊，
久不相見，
卒然相睹，
歎然遺故，
私情相語，

Perhaps si 私 is here not an adjective but a noun.

ti 體 “system” the organised whole of various qing 情, hence the current da ti 大體 “overall system”, as in SUWEN 12 得病之情知治之大體也 “get the underlying factors of the disease and understand the overall system of medical care of disease”. But the semantics of ti 體 are more complex than we can take up here.

xin 心 “heart” is, of course, far too complicated to take up in any detail here, but the meaning “attitude” is much more general than the highly specific qing 情 “basic response to a situation, fundamental dynamic disposition to react”.

xing 性 “inborn nature” is the most important one of the synonyms and needs to be dealt with in some detail. It shares with qing 情 the feature of innateness and of basic disposition. However, xing 性 is primarily not a response to outside things but an autogenous disposition to behave in a certain way. Thus we do say that xing shan 性善 “nature is good”, but we do not say that qing shan 情善 “that one’s basic instinctive reactions/responses to things are good”. In adverbial position xing 性 means “by nature” and emphasises the congenital nature of the condition, whereas qing 情 emphasises the hardly changeable deeply engrained nature of that condition.

Here is a case were qing 情 and xing 性 are explicitly contrasted:

Perhaps si 私 is here not an adjective but a noun.

In the large majority of cases, xing 性 is not replaceable with qing 情, and it is important to analyse why this is so in order to get the precise semantic nuances of qing 情. One thing is that the innateness in qing 情 is not so prominent a feature and is not commonly played upon:

(103) ZHUANG 8.313
故意仁義其非人情乎！

Therefore, one suspects that humaneness and righteousness are not basic human instincts.

In the large majority of cases, xing 性 is not replaceable with qing 情, and it is important to analyse why this is so in order to get the precise semantic nuances of qing 情. One thing is that the innateness in qing 情 is not so prominent a feature and is not commonly played upon:

(104) MENG 6A03; tr. D. C. Lau 2.223
告子曰：
「生之謂性。」

Gàozi said, “The inborn is called ‘inborn nature’.”

The xing 性 “nature” includes propensities and instincts qing 情 but typically with a special focus on their congenital nature:

(105) XUN 23.02.01; 23:1a, Knoblock 3:150, tr. CH
今人之性，
生而有好利焉，

Now human nature is such that from birth he is prone to seek his own advantage.

When such word-play is involved we rarely find qing 情.
Our innate endowment includes the particular physical shape and complexion that we have. Xing 性 can refer to the specific innate endowments of a person of other kinds:

Thus one xing 性 can differ from another in ways that qing 情 are not said to differ:

An owl can catch fleas at night and can discern the tip of a downy hair, but when it comes out during the day it stares blankly and can't even spy a hill or a mountain, and this means creatures have different natures.

SHENDAO does, however, say that it is a basic feature of people they differ:

The people live in diverse conditions and circumstances, but each person has his own abilities. Their abilities are not the same.

Paul Thompson's translation is illuminating in many ways, and it illustrates the plausibility of A.C. Graham's way of reading the word in many contexts.

The fact that one has instincts is not itself an instinct qing 情 but part of one's stable innate human nature xing 性:

I do not believe that qing 情 would have been possible here.

Also inanimate non-living creatures have xing 性 "natural properties" just as they have qing 情 "essential features":

Here qing 情 would be possible, but since no desires are involved, it is not particularly preferred.

The famous swimmer in ZHUANG refers to his own specific nature as it is shaped by his childhood:
Properly speaking it is the desire to do these things that is part of one's inborn nature. So this usage comes close in meaning to one of the core meanings of qing 情, but still, without an explicit mention of this desire, one might argue that xing 性 "inborn nature" here is different from qing 情 "basic instinct".

The question whether qing 情 "fundamental instincts" are good never arises in ancient Chinese literature. The issue is about the xing 性 "inborn nature" of the individual person or of persons in general:

(118) XUN 23.01.01; 23.1a, Knoblock 3:150
人之性惡,
其善者偽也。
Man's nature is evil,
and what is good in him is
man-made.

(119) XUN 23.04.02; xin zhu 391; 23:1c, Knoblock 3:152
凡性者,
天之就也,
不可學,
不可事。
In general, when it comes to human
nature it is what Nature tends towards,
and it is not something that one can
try to learn,
or something one can work at.

(120) XUN 23.04.03; xin zhu 391; 23:1c, Knoblock 3:152
不可學、不可事而在人者,
謂之性;
謂之偽,
是性、僞之分也。
That in man which can be studied
but cannot be worked for
is called human nature;
that in man which one can apply
oneself to and learn, which one can
work on and perfect,
that is called artifice.

And when xing 性 is described in terms of the use of the senses, a typical description is in terms not of appetitive desire but cognitive potential:

(121) XUN 23.04.04; xin zhu 391; 23:1c, Knoblock 3:152
今人之性,
Now it is part of human nature
目可以見，耳可以聽。
夫可以見之明不離目，
可以聽之聰不離耳；
目明而耳聰，
不可學明義矣。

that the eye can see, and that the ear can hear. The visual faculty of seeing is inseparable from the eye, and the acoustic faculty of hearing is inseparable from the ear. The visual faculty of the eye and the acoustic faculty of the ear, one cannot apply oneself to these and develop these intelligent faculties.

What is objectively likely to happen because of one’s inborn nature is typically xìng 性 and what is bound to happen primarily for external reasons is míng 命 “fate”.

(122) HF 50.09:01; Chen Qitian 18; Chen Qiyou 1099; Zhou Xunchu 692; Zhu Shouliang 1790; Watson 126
今或謂人曰：“使子必智而壽”，
則世必以為狂。

Suppose someone were to tell people: “I will make sure you will be wise and that you will live long lives!” then the world would be bound to consider him mad.

夫智，性也；
命也。

Wisdom is a matter of inborn nature; is a matter of fate.

Xìng 性 here is the inborn nature not of man in general, but of a certain imagined person. This xìng 性 will differ very much from one person to another.

Note that in xìng 性 there generally tends to be no element of desire:

(123) HF 19.02:03; Chen Qitian 204; Chen Qiyou 307; Zhou Xunchu 170; Zhu Shouliang 574
亂弱者亡，
人之性也；
治強者王，
古之道也。

That those who are unruly and weak will fail is in accordance with the human condition; that those who are orderly and strong become kings is an ancient pattern.

Moreover, the word refers specifically to the natural character of individuals:

(124) HF 23.22:02; Chen Qiyou 464; Zhou Xunchu 261; Zhu Shouliang 807
民性有恆！
曲為曲，
直為直。

The people will be predictable in their disposition. Then crookedness will count as crookedness and straightness will count as straightness.

(125) HF 24.01:03; Chen Qiyou 479; Zhou Xunchu 273; Zhu Shouliang 834
西門豹之性急，
故佩韋以緩己。

Xímén Bào was hot-tempered by nature so he wore a soft leather belt to soften himself down.

This remained a popular usage throughout Han times:

(126) CHUCI JIUBIAN 06:02; SBBY 317; Huang 147; Fu 148; tr. Hawkes 213
性愚愚以愚誰兮，
信未達乎從容。

And though dull and stupid by nature and poor in talents, I restrain myself and learn to mourn in verses.
Unworthy as I am, stupid and benighted, I am by nature unintelligent. [However,] I have received not a little favour from my now-deceased father, and I could rely on my mother's, my teacher's, regulation and instruction.

The innate nature of 性 is emphasised by the addition of the word 天 "from Heaven/Nature":

Apart from one passage in XUN, we do not find the combination 天 情 in the literature I have surveyed.

It is not that you were partial to me and therefore reacted like this. It was that your Heaven-given nature is kindly and your heart is inherently like that. This is why I felt pleased and felt grateful to you."

Against this nature from Heaven one may inflict harm or injury:

The inborn nature of people
that they delight in chaos and do not keep to the law.

At times, though, the distinction between 性 and 情 does come close to being neutralised:

The inborn natural relation between a child and a mother is one of love; the power relations between ministers and rulers is a matter of strategy.
But in these two examples, the reference is not to current sentiment but to general disposition. We can say that in such examples the difference between qing 情 and xing 性 is neutralised, and thus they give very important evidence in connection with our study of qing 情.

However, even when the two terms are used together, their force is perhaps still distinct:

(134) XUN 23.02.02; 23:1a, Knoblock 3:150, tr. CH
生而有耳目之欲，
From birth he has desires of the ear and of the eye,

有好聲色焉，
he is fond of sounds and of female beauty.

順是，
When he acts in accordance with such tendencies,

故淫亂生
then profligacy and political unrest will arise,

而禮義文理亡焉。
and ritual propriety, rectitude, decorousness and principle will disappear.

然則從人之性，
Thus if one follows the nature of man

順人之情，
and acts in accordance with man's basic sentiments,

必出於爭奪，
then this is bound to result in competitive struggle for things combined with the flaunting of social divisions and the confusing of principles;

而歸於暴。
so that all naturally ends up in violence.

(135) NJ 7
雖以賢女之行，
Even if she has the moral behaviour of a worthy woman,

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聰哲之性，
even if she has the endowments of a clever and wise woman,

其能備乎？
can a woman be perfect?

(136) LUNHENG 13, ed Liú Pánsūi 1990, p. 141 reports the crucial distinction between xing 性 and qing 情:

性，
Nature

生而然者也，
is that which is so by birth;

在於身而不發。
it is present in the person, and it does not emerge.

情，
The passions

接於物而然者也，
are something that arises from contact with things,

出形於外，
and they manifest themselves on the outside.

This shows how qing 情 was conceived as interactive with things, related to responses. Wang Chong explicitly distances himself from earlier, ambiguous usages.

yi 意 "intention" which is not innate, instinctive or reactive to the outside world, but which comes close to qing 情 "fundamental response to a situation, basic reaction to a situation" where that response or reaction can take the form of a plan or a determination to do something, where qing 情 always involves heart-felt commitment whereas yi 意 only denotes an idea, a decision or a plan of any kind.

yà 欲 "desire; actual desires" contrasts as negative and reprehensible with the neutral and sometimes even positive qing 情 "basic sentiments, basic inclinations". Yà欲 can very often refer to ephemeral, changeable, superficial urges or even temporary intentions and is always a positive urge for—not against—something, whereas qing 情 can refer to both positive and negative, but typically basic, constitutive, or instinctive reactions of all kinds to things. ZGC 2.1; tr. Crump 1979 no. 7, p. 28, ed. Shanghaiguji p. 45 君之情 “your real basic intentions/inclinations” is glossed by the old commentary (footnote 21) as: 心所欲也 “what the heart desires”, and in this context the word does come close to yà 欲 in meaning. However, such usages are very rare.
LAO 61 oxymoronically recommends "the sage’s desire is not to desire", and the least one must do is reduce the number of one’s 欲 “desires”, and there never is any quesitio of reducing the number of 情 情:

(137) MENG 7B35; tr. D. C. Lau 2.301

孟子曰：

「養心莫善於寡欲。」

Mencius said,

“There is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce the number of desires.”

(138) HF 20.24:01; Chen Qiyou 361; Zhu Shouliang 641; Zhou Xunchu 198;

人有欲，

則計會亂，

When men have strong desires

then their calculations and plannings are confused.

欲 “lusts” seem always to be negatively loaded and reprehensible, often linked to the equally reprehensible 慾 “cravings” for objects of desire, as we have seen above. In any case, giving rein to them is tantamount to immorality:

(139) HF 44.10:02; Chen Qitian 245; Chen Qiyou 931; Zhu Shouliang 1546; Zhou Xunchu 607; Liao 2.226

趙之先君敬侯，

The former ruler of Zhao, Lord Jing,

不修德行，

did not cultivate virtuous behaviour

而好縱慾，

and he was fond of giving free rein to his desires.

In any case, one is in no doubt about the implications when Confucius pronounces his judgment:

(140) LY 5.11; tr. CH

子曰：

「吾未見剛者。」

The Master said:

“I have never met anyone who has firm convictions.”

或對曰：

「申枨。」

Someone responded to this:

“How about Shên Chêng?”

The lusts condemn Chêng as a softling.

真 真 “true, genuine” specifies that something is non-fake, unwarped, pristine, and it comes close to some usages of 情 情 “essential, basic, real, inalienable”. However, the distinction becomes clear when one considers combinations such as 真人 真人 “True Man” which has no classical pendant 情人 情人 “modern Chinese: lover”. 真 is current as a main verb and may take intensive adverbs:

(141) ZHUANG 7.275

其知情信，

His knowledge was truly reliable,

其德甚真，

his integrity very genuine.

情 in the related sense is metaphysical and absolute, and in fact often adverbial, although it is not clear whether the word really needs to be taken adverbially in this particular context.

志 “aspirations” is something waiting to be realised in action, and the word is current in essentially related verbal usages, as in the idiomatic 真志 真志 “aspire to; be bent on” which naturally takes the object 仁 “benevolence”. By contrast, 情 is something waiting to be disclosed, expressed. The result of a failure to expectorate is 寂寞 “lonesomeness” and bitter discontent:

(142) CHUCI, qijian, miujian, ed. SBBY p. 430; tr. David Hawkes

願承聞而效志兮，

I wanted to wait on his leisure, to show him my intent;

恐犯忌而干譴。

But I feared to infringe on some ban or prohibition.

卒掩情以寂寞兮，

In the end I restrained my feelings

然抱懼而自悲。

and kept silent;

And so I grieve still in bitter
discontent.
zhì 质 “substance” refers to an inert basic substratum quite unlike the dynamic fundamental disposition of things to respond to other things that is called qìng 情, although in poetry, the difference can occasionally be neutralised.

It is my claim that we properly understand the meaning of the word qìng 情 in the texts we investigate to the extent that we understand what motivates the choice of that word versus the possible choice of other words that might appear to be plausible candidates in certain specific contexts. Thus my primary aim is not to find any one plausible English “equivalent” for qìng 情. The aim is to define the parameters of semantic contrasts in the ancient language which define the place of that word in the relevant ancient Chinese conceptual schemes.

ANTONYMS
The meanings of a word are often best understood when one considers its antonyms. In what follows I give a brief survey of selected antonyms, and I discuss only such details as seem relevant to the proper understanding of qìng 情.

cì 言 “verbal formulations” contrast with unarticulated basic qìng 情 “real feelings” that need expression.

mào 魚 “appearance” is in frequent contrast with qìng 情. What defines “metaphysical” qìng 情 is its opposition to 魚 “outer appearance”, even yín 言 “outer verbalisation”. These are mere hú 領 “acoutrements, outward flourishes” of what is inward, essential, and all-important:

(143) GY 11.2, ed. Shanghaijigui p. 394
吾見其貌而欲之, 闻其言而惡之。
When I see his shape I want him, when I hear his speeches I dislike him.

言, 貌之華也;
speeches are a function of external shape.

The obvious function of music is to bring these innermost sensibilities into a kind of harmony:

(145) LIJ 19; Couvreur 2.55f; Sūn Xiān 10.28; tr. Legge 2.98
樂者為同, 楽者為異。
Similarity and union are the aim of music;
difference and distinction, that of ceremony.

同則相親, 遠則相敬,
From union comes mutual affection;
樂勝則流, 禮勝則離。
Where music prevails, we find weak coalescence;
禮樂之事也。
where ceremony prevails, a tendency to separation.

To align the basic instincts and to beautify external appearances that is the task of propriety and of music.

However we take this passage, it neither invites nor allows an interpretation of human qìng 情 in terms of emotions or passions.

In LIJ there is no question but that qìng 情 are essential to man, and inward, opposed to mào 魚 “outward appearance”:

子曰：
「君子不以色貌人」
“The superior man is not affectionate to others with his countenance
mere) as if, while distant in fundamental attitude, he was close in appearance.”

The person is the essential inner feature
and it forms within.
Speech is an outward adornment of the person.
Instinctual reactions can jar with each other in an emotional cacophony. The purpose of music is construed as being the standard instrument of harmonisation.

In poetry as in prose, these innermost quintessentially real feelings are customarily opposed to mere outer appearance:

For my words and my deeds followed one in the steps of the other,
And that which I felt and that which I showed, between them there was no change.

*mìng* 名 “names”, being only ways of talking, contrast naturally with those qìng 情 which are the real factors that shape reality. Compare ZUO Ai 8.02 鬻有名而無情 “Liù has the name (of being a great state), but not the essential dynamic features (that would make it into a great state)”. It seems clear that qìng 情 is more dynamic in force here than shì 實 “the objective features required to qualify” would have been. It is as if qìng 情 comes close to “inner driving force, inner momentum”.

shēn 身 “the body”, being outwardly manifest, standardly contrasts with the inner dynamic instincts qìng 情 that govern one’s conduct of the body.

wén 文 “elegant form” often naturally contrasts as an antonym with qìng 情 “unpolished fundamental instinctive responses”.

wù 物 “things” contrast with the fundamental factors qìng 情 that shape these things.

xìng 行 “overt behaviour” contrasts with qìng 情 “basic propensity” as well as xìng 性 “inborn nature”.

*xìng* 形 “outer form” and *mào* 貌 “appearance” are both frequent antonyms to the inner and at least potentially hidden qìng 情 “fundamental factors; basic inner responses and attitudes to things”.

Throughout the texts I have investigated one cannot “feel” a qìng 情, one cannot be anything like “overwhelmed” by qìng 情. Thus the relations into which one can enter with qìng 情 differ widely from those one might expect as a comparative student of Latin or Greek. There are severe restrictions on the way in which the concept of qìng 情 enters classical Chinese discourse and syntax. It is for this reason that a satisfactory account of qìng 情 must involve a rich selection of representative examples of how the word is actually used. It is not good enough just to specify the semantic nuances the word has, and the other words which it contrasts with. We also need to know the pragmatic and syntactic contexts in which the word enters classical Chinese linguistic practice.

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THE SEMANTICS OF QING情
IN CHÂN BUDDHIST CHINESE

CHRISTOPH ANDERL

This article is a case study on the use of the Chinese character qing情 in Chân Buddhist texts as exemplified in the 10th-century historical Chân text Zitâng jì祖堂集.

The term qing in Buddhist texts is most frequently used in the compound yǒu qìng有情 ‘have/be endowed with qing’ > ‘those who have qing’ > ‘sentient beings’ and in its antonym wú qìng无情 ‘not have qing > those who do not have qing > non-sentient (objects)’.

In part one of this paper, the meanings and usages of the term qing are investigated.

In Buddhist texts, qing does not usually mean ‘real state of affairs’, ‘real feeling’ or ‘emotion’. On the contrary qing refers to the activities of the “unenlightened mind” and thus has a rather negative connotation. Qing refers to secondary mental processes which are generated through contact with the external world. The sense data which are received through contact with external objects and thought-objects are interpreted in a deluded way and diverted into mind tendencies. The failure to recognize the true nature of things can result in attachment to the object (passion, desire) or mental processes of conceptualizing, evaluating, discriminating, etc. which, by Buddhist standards, all give a deluded perspective of the world.

Very rarely qing is modified in a way that makes it into a positive concept.

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